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The judicialization of Israeli
Military Ethics
A political analysis of the Supreme Court’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
La judiciarisation de l’éthique militaire en Israël
Samia Chouchane
1 For many years, what has been referred to as the Supreme Court’s “hyper activism” has
constituted one of the most impassioned debates in Israeli politics, especially with regard
to the role and level of control which the highest judicial institution should wield on
issues  related  to  the  conflict  with  the  Palestinians.  Amongst  the  most  criticized
interventions are the Court’s rulings on military matters. These are so numerous that the
Supreme Court is now considered to be the final authority on what the Israeli Defence
Forces  (IDF)  can do  or  not  do  in  warfare.  The  origin  of  such  a  phenomenon  is  a
progressive but clear “judicialization” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We shall define
judicialization as a process characterized by the ability of the judicial authorities to create
norms and restrictions to the detriment of executive and legislative powers. 
2 The best proof of this judicialization can be seen in the legal debate over the route of the
Security Wall (or Security Fence) between Israel and the Palestinian territories, in which
decisions are made within the judicial arena1. Such a situation has created numerous legal
restrictions, bon an mal an, with regard to Israeli military ethics2, which we define as a
corpus of values, principles and practices, which have been elaborated in various texts
and speeches pertaining to military conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court has undeniably
become one of  the main “producers” of  military ethics,  a  phenomenon which amply
demonstrates  to  what  extent  the  Israeli  political  system is  engaged  in  a  process  of
judicialization. 
3 We can even assert that every important political and social issue in the State of Israel
has been affected by the reconsideration of the role of the judge and, most notably, the
Supreme  Court.  One  can  even  state  that  the  entire  “public  sphere”,  to  use  Itshak
Galnoor’s formula3, has been judicialized, and to such an extent, that, in the eyes of many
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experts, it has constituted one of the greatest accomplishments of a democratic society4.
Of course, such a situation has created numerous debates and controversies5. Critics of
judicial activism have often levelled their attacks at former Supreme Court President,
Aharon Barak (1995-2006), since he personified a policy according to which “everything is
justiciable”. This policy represents the fundamental basis for the evolution of the role of
the Supreme Court role in Israel. But even if Aharon Barak provided an important and
crucial  impetus,  his  vision was  not  the  only  factor that  explains  this  evolution.  The
empowerment of the judicial authorities is in reality a form of mirror of the internal and
external evolutions of the State of Israel,  which allowed the expression of an activist
tendency discernable from the early years of the existence of the State6. As Eli Salzberger
precisely observed, if the personality of Aharon Barak was an important factor in the
development  of  this  process,  judicialization,  as  such,  should  be  analyzed  through  a
“fascinating combination” of the personal and institutional factors that have led to the
increasing power of the Supreme Court in political, social and military matters. It is this
combination which created the ineluctable process of judicialization, as already defined.
This phenomenon is based on a very fundamental idea, namely, the Court, as referee,
representing a  sort  of  “palliative”  authority,  in  the  absence of  other  political  actors
(leaders, administrations, etc.
4 In this sense, the judicialization of the Israeli battlefield constitutes both the expression
and  the  outcome  of  the  rising  importance  of  demands  related  to  various,  unsolved
problems created by the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967:
the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza, the legal status of Palestinians, the legal
framework  of  military  activities,  and  the  question  of  the  settlements,  etc.  Jacques
Commaille attributes, quite rightly, this process of judicialization to the “crisis of the
political  system  and  its  incapacity  to  mediate  social  demands”7 which  created  an
auspicious  context  for  its  emergence.  In  addition,  the  weakness  of  decision-making
institutions in Israel is quite evident and even emphasized by the strength of partisan
politics.  Thus,  the  Israeli  political  system,  characterized  by  this  partisan  political
environment, has promoted policies, which can be objectively considered arbitrary and
partial, since it showed itself unable to solve and even to deal with important political
and social issues such as the conflict with the Palestinians. This situation, characterized
by a structural weakness of the political regime, has made the Supreme Court one of the
most symbolic institutions of the “restoration of the political sovereignty of the Jewish
people”8 (like  the  military  paradoxically),  and it  is  perceived as  a  guarantee  for  the
preservation  of  a  democratic  system  plagued  by  divisions.  To  cite  Martin  Edelman,
Israelis perceive the “judicial space” as a sort of guardian of their founding democratic
values. In such a context, it was considered important to insure the autonomy of judicial
institutions. This explains why Israelis have shown such trust in the Supreme Court, and
why  they  perceive  it  as  an  “island”  of  impartiality  and  independence  in  a  partisan
context. This phenomenon is not, by the way, very new: P. Elman noted, in 1971, that the
Supreme Court  was  viewed as  a  traditional  symbol  of  independence,  dispassion  and
impartiality9.  However,  with  regard  to  military  affairs,  particularly  those  related  to
military conduct and ethics, these three characteristics, though expressed imperfectly10,
created a new, fundamental restriction over the IDF: the judicial authorities now have the
power to review military orders and decisions11. 
5 Such  a  “foray”,  a  military  expression  often  used  by  Israeli  officers  to  express  their
feelings about interventions by the Supreme Court, became paradoxically possible in the
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context of the fight against terrorism. This “daily battle”12 is marked, in Israel as in other
democratic  countries,  by  a  difficult  but  necessary  balance  between  security
considerations, on the one hand, and the imperative preservation of society’s democratic
values, on the other. Considered as a real test of Israeli democracy13, and one of the most
complicated issues at the international level14, the war against terror offered the judiciary
an opportunity to proclaim that laws are not silent in times of war15. On the contrary, as
one judge declared, the security of the State of Israel should not be carried out in a legal
vacuum16. Under certain conditions and limits, the Supreme Court functions ideally as an
institution of control and, if needed, with the power to sanction military operations in the
Occupied Territories. 
6 This question, needless to say, is not new, since the power of judicial authorities over the
decisions and actions of the executive power have been amply discussed. A simple look at
the literature devoted to this subject, which would necessitate an entire study, illustrates
the great interest aroused by the role of the judiciary in conflict-related issues17, in Israeli
academic circles, and in social sciences, more generally. In this respect, we can mention
some fundamental points, based either on an analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions,
or on a more general study of its position and policy toward administrative detentions18,
expulsions19 and demolitions of terrorists’ homes20. In this sense, David Kretzmer’s book,
The Occupation of Justice21, which offers an in-depth, critical study of the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s position towards the Palestinian Territories can be considered the most
complete  reference.  It  is,  nonetheless,  important  to  note  that  research  on  judicial
activism in military affairs was greatly influenced by the first Intifada, which represented
a real turning point in the Israeli military occupation, since this event created a situation
where security concerns became an unprecedented daily preoccupation. The Palestinian
uprising of 1987 drastically transformed military and security demands, to the extent
that it “considerably undermined Palestinian civilian liberties”22, according Yoav Dotan.
The subject of many debates and controversies, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
was  viewed by many critics,  such as  Daphna Sharfmann,  as  more symbolically,  than
substantially, protective of Palestinians rights and liberties, without really ameliorating
Palestinians daily life23. The Supreme Court has even been described as “schizophrenic”
by Anat Biletzki, who considers its jurisprudence to be incoherent24. On the other hand,
the Court’s positions have also been accused of being too liberal, and based on a secular
vision of the State of Israel,  by critics such as Hillel  Neuer,  who writes of a “judicial
empire” ruled by super-power judges25. 
7 As a tentative contribution to this debate we shall try to provide some elements for a
political analysis and study of a problem that has become ubiquitous within the Israeli
armed  forces.  We  shall  be  concerned  exclusively  with  issues  related  to  ethics  and
morality  in  warfare,  and  avoid  the  usual  distinction  between  internal  and  external
factors.  The  judicialization  of  Israeli  military  ethics  represents  a  truly  political
phenomenon,  with  multiple  causes,  which  has  created  new  legal  restrictions.  Such
activism also originated in new military perceptions and practices which, in our opinion,
also led to the evolution of a new culture of war within the army. We, therefore, wish to
study this phenomenon through two main questions: how did the Supreme Court become
such an important actor and producer of Israeli military ethics and what is the main
impact of this judicial activism on issues related to ethics and morality in war?
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The evolution of the Israeli military context
“Israel is not an isolated island, but forms of the international
system” (Judge Barak)26
8 The growing influence of a usually restricted judicial authority is not specific to Israel, for
it is the expression of an important new phenomenon: the consideration of the rule of law
in armed conflict at the international level. Many scholars have qualified such a process
as a victory of the Liberal School based on a “representation of the world in which the use
of  force  is  not  ubiquitous”27.  This  process,  coming immediately  after  the  end of  the
dislocation of the USSR, contributed to a notable transformation of the Israeli security
paradigm,  historically  deeply  rooted  in  a  Hobbesian  “gladiator  bearing”28 stance,
symbolized by the maximization of power, especially of the military which was seen as
the sole guarantee of  security in a Middle-Eastern hostile environment.  A process of
rethinking Israeli perceptions, historically based on a hard-line realistic approach and
fervently defended by generations of Israeli officers, emerged and contributed to a more
liberal vision. Security remains an absolute referent, but “political, economical, social and
even environmental components” are now also important factors29. 
9 Barry Buzan, considered the father of this new approach30, which is largely based on the
research of American theoretician, Kenneth Walz, explains that security, in this sense,
should be understood as “the ability of a society to keep its owns characteristics despite
the changing conditions and threats,  real  or potential.  Or rather,  security affects the
permanence of traditional schemes of language, culture, associations, identity, national
or  religious  practices,  considering evolutions  deemed as  acceptable”31.  Thus,  security
obeys the same logic as other democratic institutions, namely, the need to reconcile the
interests of the State (defence, way of life, values, national culture, identity, etc.) with the
interests  of  individual  citizens  (freedom  of  speech,  of  movement,  etc.).  In  such  a
democratic  context,  which  requires  an  arbiter,  the  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  is
fundamental and even promoted since it represents an independent institution. 
10 This evolution should be seen in the context of a more general transformation: after the
end of the Cold War, a period marked by a realistic vision based on a paradigm of power
and interests, there emerged an idealistic vision of international relations founded on the
quest for peace.  This vision, based on the Kantian concept of perpetual peace,  which
inspired  the  first  international  institutions  dedicated  to  the  promotion  a  peaceful
resolution of armed conflict (SDN), foresaw the rule of law as the main instrument in the
achievement of peace. The emergence of an international judicial order, which insists on
the necessity of justification, of obligation to give accounts32,  determine and attribute
responsibilities, as well as the development and institutionalization of various processes
of repentance (since “to regret means changing the past”33) perfectly reflect this new
culture: a culture of the primacy of the rule of law, at war, and in war. This doctrine,
naturally, reinforced the application of laws and of procedures such as the process of
appeal to a Court, considered the ultimate guardian of human rights, values and dignity,
this even more in times of crisis and chaos than in peaceful situations. The philosopher
Michael Walzer, author of “Just and unjust War”34, sums this up when he asserts that,
finally, “justice became in this way a military necessity”35. As a result, “both the pretexts
of war and the terms of its conduct”36, are now commonly debated in the media. 
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11 This international context, influenced by an idealistic vision of the world, encouraged the
emergence of private actors, due mainly to the development and sophistication of global
communications.  This is  the reason why some have asserted the existence of “public
opinion”  as  an  actor  in  international  relations,  since  it  can  supposedly  be  quickly
mobilized for humanitarian or political causes. In contemporary conflicts, such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, war, “before being a military matter is a matter of words”37. In
such a context, the conduct of Israeli soldiers tends to attract attention and criticism, and
create a fury of passions. Indeed, images of the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli
army, opposing soldiers against demonstrators, has placed the problem of military ethics
in the foreground,  both in the media and within the military.  Children facing tanks,
stones against lethal weapons, bulldozers against families not only constituted negative
images of Israel, but also conveyed interpretations of the soldiers’ moral values. These
images appeared in complete contradiction with the declared tradition of  the Israeli
armed forces to uphold high moral and ethical standards and obligations. 
12 This situation is summed up by Steven Metz according to whom, “the era of asymmetry”
sealed the end of a period when the military were the guardians of security38. Henceforth,
in view of the threats faced by democratic states, the military component of national
security remains important but is no longer predominant. Military power has become
secondary, especially in political terms39, since asymmetry tends to transfer the conflict
from the battlefield to the “Internet, the media, demonstrations, the United Nations, and
other forums of political and psychological struggles”40. In consequence, we can better
understand  why  the  judicial  arena  is  perceived  as  a  place  of  possible  victory,  since
winning a military battle is not considered anymore as a sine qua non for political victory.
Reparations are now part of the conflict, part of the power relations between the actors in
a conflict, and these actors are not necessarily members of military institutions – any
individual can now enter the arena. 
 
Converging internal socio-political evolutions
13 The empowerment of the Supreme Court can also be explained by various predispositions
41 since such as converging elements in the evolution of the Israeli social and political
internal context. Citing Jacques Commaille, Hélène Sallon, who analyzed the process of
Arab  citizens’  collective  claims  in  the  judicial  arena42,  explains  the  multiplicity  of
converging elements: she cites “the advent of democratic individualism, the shifting role
of the State” as well as, “the contractualisation of social relationships”. She also identifies
the empowerment of civil society, in opposition to Israel’s dominant military and political
cultures  which  traditionally  valorised  the  armed  forces  and,  in  particular,  their
socializing role. She also describes the emergence of a “peace culture” which came into
being following the beginning of diplomatic negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict.  In  the  same  vein,  Udi  Lebel  talks  about  an  Israeli  civil  society  in  rapid
development  which began to  challenge the historical  military sovereignty,  the Israel
which considered itself an army43.
14 There is no exhaustive list of conditions for the emergence of this complex judicialization
process,  but  we  can  find  a  coordination  of  concurrent  elements  involved  within  a
favourable  context,  namely,  the  separation of  powers.  Basically,  the  principle  of  the
separation of powers is favourable to judicial authorities, and the independence of the
Supreme Court is understood as the basis of the democratic ideal and its values44: liberty
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of  expression,  equality,  respect  for  human rights,  etc.  In  this  sense,  Aharon Barak’s
“Lockean” perception underlines what can be considered to be his life mission, his true
historical  stamp  –  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  block  consisting  of  various
fundamental and, henceforth, statutory rights45. This Israeli “constitutional revolution”46
is based on the notion of safeguarding human dignity and individual liberty above all.
Any ordinary law, ordinance, order or even decision that breaks with this principle can be
rendered void by the Court. This is the fundamental basis of Judge Barak’s judiciary policy
in support of restrictions over military actions, since, in his view, the function and role of
judicial authorities is to secure a balance of power and establish mechanisms of control in
cases of violation of the democratic process. It is also in the name of the separation of
powers that the Court’s power of interpretation is considered an important factor in
ensuring  the  independence  of  the  judicial  authority47.  This  great  capacity  of
interpretation was  used by the Supreme Court  to  elaborate  a  liberal  case  law,  more
protective of individual rights, thus demonstrating “a certain audacity by applying its
control  to  norms for  which its  competence  is  not  formally  planned”48.  According to
Françoise Dreyfus,  this means “choosing between different values and principles,  and
referring to social values underlined by the rule of law”49. For Aharon Barak, as for many
other Supreme Court judges, the rule of law represents a reflection of social values50. In
this  case,  Israeli  society,  even  before  the  creation  of  the  State,  shaped  an  ethical
framework for the conduct of its soldiers when using force, thus founding a tradition of
strong commitment to military ethics. 
 
A military tradition committed to moral conduct on the
part of its soldiers
The most moral military in the world?
15 Both military and political cultures have, almost unanimously, established an ideal for
the moral use of force by armed troops. Questions relating to morality in military conduct
are so central in Israel that, for some experts, the IDF is the world’s “most moral armed
force”51. While it is difficult to evaluate the reality of this phenomenon in the field, this
reputation is based on a deep, undeniable preoccupation with the ethical dimensions of
the use of force, a preoccupation that can be considered an historical political choice by
the  Zionist  leadership  even  before  the  establishment  of  the  State.  One  of  the  most
important debates between the Zionist  groups centred around the ethical  framework
governing the use of military force by the Jewish defence organizations of the Yishuv, and
especially  the issue of  the army’s  collective conduct  vis-à-vis Palestinian attacks.  The
Haganah, the embryo of the future Israeli army, adopted a strategy of self-defence for the
Jewish community based on a doctrine of restriction, called in Hebrew “Havlagah”. This
doctrine of moderation established an ethical signpost for Haganah soldiers and later for
the IDF, which inherited a similar principle in the famous concept of the “purity of arms”
(Tohar haneshek); this expression was forged before the creation of the State but it has
constituted the core of the IDF’s moral values52. If the formulation is somewhat clumsy,
the intended meaning is clear: the use of military force is limited to counteracting armed
enemies and aims to avoid harming civilian populations. This principle ideally suggests
that,  during  military  missions,  the  rules  of  humanity  must  be  respected.  Entire
generations of  soldiers were inculcated in the principle of  the purity of  arms,  which
The judicialization of Israeli Military Ethics
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 20 | 2009
6
means, according to the words of a former commander: “to forgive, to renounce, and to
have pity; to do nothing above and beyond military necessity”53. This concept constitutes
the basis of the military ethos to which Israeli society demonstrated its commitment by
compelling the army to give an account of its conduct during demonstrations and by
enabling appeals to the Supreme Court through Israeli human rights defence associations.
 
 “Shooting and crying”
16 The issue of Tohar haneshek as a “moral signpost,” however, is categorically linked to the
question of Israel’s war legitimacy, the reconsideration of which has been the occasion to
question the content of military ethics54. After the repressions in the occupied territories
following the Yom Kippur War, the Lebanon War and the first Intifada, moral confusion
increased within the IDF. Torn between the military necessity to defend their country (eïn
brera,  “we  have  no  choice”)  and  the  cultural,  social  commitment  to  military  ethics,
obedience to orders was followed by tears. This phenomenon, known as “shooting and
crying” (bokhim vé yorim) represents a challenge to the military’s code of ethics, in an
asymmetrical conflict55. In Israel, as in other contexts (most notably, the Vietnam war for
the United States), warfare and its modalities have become, increasingly, the objects of
political debates. A real process of desecrating the armed forces has begun and criticism
of the army is no longer taboo. 
17 This unprecedented phenomenon of questioning led to an important process of reflection
on general ethics and morals. In 1994, a Code of Ethics, named officially “The Spirit of the
Israeli Defence Forces” (Ruach Zahal), was adopted and became the “identity card of the
IDF’s values,” to be used as the reference for all  military actions56.  Labelled a failure,
especially because its content was not sufficiently rooted in Israeli national culture and
values, the code was contested in a country where the political identity of the State is in
constant oscillation between Jewishness and secularism. Presented as the formalization of
the army’s ethics in one official document (related in part to the growing influence of the
ethical discourse within the Zionist-religious camp), the document did not succeed (but
could it?)  in resolving all  the ethical  problems that emerge from the battlefield.  The
problem of military ethics, in general, and the Israeli case. in particular, thus remains
unsolved. This is the reason why certain issues are submitted to the judicial authorities
where they find the beginning of a solution in respect of what soldiers are allowed to do
or not to do. 
 
The Supreme Court censor of the armed forces?
18 Amos N. Guiora57, an Israeli-American jurist who greatly contributed to the study of the
laws of war within the armed forces, explains the new phenomenon thus: the Supreme
Court of Israel, increasingly intervening in military matters, has become, consciously or
not, a general controller of Israeli soldiers’ behaviour in the Territories; this in the name
of  the  democratic  ideal  of  protecting  the  balance  between  national  security  and
individual  rights58.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  actions  of  President Barak,  and other
members  of  judicial  institutions,  should  be  understood:  making  democracy  real,  not
simply a formality59.
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Control in the name of a mini-legal revolution
19 Considering the universally accepted fact that terrorism created new challenges both to
military institutions (and the police)60 and to the need to protect citizens against this
form of “arbitrary murder that can hit at any time”61, the Supreme Court established an
important, fundamental principle: there is no legal vacuum. This explains why it became
very common to hear some Israeli soldiers qualifying the highest judicial institution of
the country as a censor of the military. The soldiers were obviously not used to such
independent intervention, however benevolent, in “their business”, generally believing
they are the only institution which ensures the security of Israel and its citizens. Military
plans are almost always approved by various cabinets, whose members are often former
senior officers, and by society itself since the army is considered the ultimate shield of
the State. The Supreme Court itself has not escaped this form of compliance with national
interests, all the more so since Israel has never stopped being in a state of war, a fact
which has valorised the notion that “for security matters,  the Supreme Court should
apply minimal control over the actions of the executive power”62. However, this situation
progressively changed: for the first time, in 1998, with the Schnitzer case, it was ruled
that the Supreme Court has the authority to review all decisions, including those taken
for Israel’s security63. Since then, this principle was clarified and reinforced to the extent
that it became applicable to military conduct. It is important to note that throughout its
interventions, the Supreme Court tried to set limits (rarely to forbid) in various fields
pertaining to military ethics, from military methods used in interrogations64 to Israel’s
humanitarian obligations in the Territories as per international law65. 
20 Such control represents an important evolution and it is linked to the question of the
admissibility of appeals made by inhabitants of the Palestinian Territories. It is important
to precise that, from 1967, it was not easy, nor evident, although theoretically possible,
for Palestinians to file appeals to the Supreme Court against military orders that limited
their rights and liberties. Because of their minimal knowledge about the Israeli judicial
and legal systems, and also because of their refusal to recognize the competence and,
thus,  legitimacy  of  Israel’s  institutions,  appeals by  Palestinians  were  “few  and  far
between”66. The jurisprudence initiated by the Elon Moreh case67, on the one hand, and the
clear definition, after Menachen Begin came to power in 1977, of a policy and strategy
toward the Territories conquered in 1967, on the other hand, transformed the rules. From
then on, appeals have become more numerous, and in the context of the reconsideration
of the admissibility doctrine, the Supreme Court’s potential level of control has grown.
The Supreme Court has had to deal with the legal status of Palestinian lands, and the laws
that  must  be  applied,  which  it  does  when  clarifying,  case  by  case,  the  various
international  legal  instruments  as  well  as  Israeli  law68.  In  the  Ja’amit  Ascan  case,  for
example, the Supreme Court made an important clarification when it ruled that the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (until 2005) were under a military occupying regime. It also stated
that  a  set  of  complex and complementary international  and national  legal  rules  and
principles  are  applicable  to  the  Palestinian  Territories.  According  to  Aharon  Barak,
“every Israeli soldier” must inculcate these rules and carry them in all circumstances,
“like a back-pack”69. 
21 The argument  of  the  Supreme Court  drew on an  interpretation and appreciation  of
military operations according to a set of national and international instruments70, notably
The judicialization of Israeli Military Ethics
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 20 | 2009
8
those we name in Latin, jus in bello. The judicial review was based on a reconstruction of
the general legal framework and the creation of a constitutionality block rooted in the
recognition of the constitutional existence of the inalienable rights and liberties of the
individual.  David  Kretzmer  speaks  quite  rightly  about  a  “mini  revolution  of  the
constitutional status of human rights in Israel”, which we believe partially revolutionized
security questions and the “problem” of the Territories, since the Court affirmed that
respect for the rule of law is part of Israeli security71.  This is why the Supreme Court
(especially through its emblematic former President), paraphrasing Cicero, adopted the
notion that, on the battlefield, laws are not silent, rather the contrary72.  After having
reversed its  own jurisprudence  on the  admissibility  of  appeals,  formerly  based on a
refusal to deal with methods used by the military73, the Court progressively began to rule
on the legal dimensions of issues such as torture, targeted killings, and what is known as
“the neighbor procedure”. These rulings, which are highly criticized and commented on,
represent symbolically the judicialization of Israeli military ethics, particularly in light of
the fact that “military necessity” was used, up to then, as a justification of the above
methods, as a lesser evil, and even as a sort of counterweight to possible measures of
control.  The  Supreme Court  clearly  recognized the  possibility  of  the  rejection of  its
judicial review, for it stated this principle in a 1986 case: “in some cases in which those
who are the shields of the State bear the responsibility of its survival and its security, it is
considered that  some breaches  to  the  rule  of  law,  with the  objective  to  protect  the
security of the State, are an inevitable necessity”74. This consideration of necessity, which
has, since then, obviously lost strength, remains however an important element for a
justification, still potentially viable and accepted by the Court. Thus, this “ancient” reality
of  war,  which  draws  on  the  principle  of  necessity  and  emergency,  is  still  present,
“preparing our minds to acts of brutality”75. 
 
The power to review military methods 
22 The judicialization of ethics is essentially manifested in decisions dealing with the use of
certain military methods which contradict ethical and legal principles.  Previously the
only master of warfare techniques or fighting against Palestinian armed groups, the IDF
became limited by various legal restrictions,  which could be occasionally be annulled
when the principle of necessity applied.  Physical  pressure and interrogation methods
employed by the army and the General Security Service obeyed this line of argument; in
some cases, because it was both necessary and the only way to obtain crucial information
for Israel’s security, a “moderate use of physical pressure” was permitted. Judge Barak,
who wrote the majority opinion in one of the most celebrated rulings of the Supreme
Court, declared, in 1994, that such methods were illegal76.  In one clause, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the notion of security “necessity,” as argued by the Executive,
by establishing two concomitant criteria for its admissibility: in a situation of a “ticking
bomb”77 and  when  there  is  “an  immediate  need  to  preserve  human  life” 78.  It  can,
therefore,  be concluded,  based on this precise definition of  absolute emergency,  that
torture is illegal. 
23 Another  interdiction,  which  stirred  up  great  controversy  and  even  a  clamour  of
indignation on the part  of  the Ministry of  Defence,  was that  against  the “neighbour
procedure”. Not well-known by the general public, this is a method of arrest which uses
human shields. To be precise, IDF soldiers would use a neighbour to approach a wanted
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man  during  an  arrest  operation.  The  neighbour  was  used  both  as  a  guarantee  and
protection  against  possible  shooting  at  the  soldiers.  Criticized  for  a  long  time  by
international law experts79,  this method was contested through a collective appeal by
various Israel human rights associations in the name of the Geneva Convention. In one of
the paragraphs of the decision pronounced on June 23, 2005, President Barak explained
that this method is in complete contradiction with international law since “it comes too
close to the normative ‘nucleus’ of what is forbidden” and, in anyway, pertains to “the
relatively grey area” of the improper and unfair80. This decision marked a turning point
regarding issues dealing with military methods since,  for the first time, the Supreme
Court  categorically  forbade  the  use  of  such  operations.  After  the  publication  of  the
decision, disagreements were expressed at the highest level of military command with
Minister  of  Defence,  Shaul  Mofaz  publicly  criticizing  the  decision  as  one  that
“endangered” soldiers, while the Chief of Staff called the troops to immediately apply the
decision in the name of every soldier’s duty to respect the Law81. 
24 It was expected that a ban on this particular method, which, according to some Israeli
associations82,  did not really prevent the armed forces from using the method again,
would also be applied to another procedure used by the military, called targeted killings
or  assassinations83.  This  kind  of  operation  consists  in  killing  a  person  considered
particularly dangerous and threatening to Israel’s security and whose arrest is deemed
complicated and dangerous for IDF soldiers. Although it has been used extensively, this
method remains a subject of much controversy in Israel and around the world. The modus
operandi, generalized as an airforce attack84, is criticized because of the collateral damage
such operations may involve85. 
25 Considered by some experts as execution without trial  and by others as a defensive,
preventive action,  this  method was also reviewed by the Supreme Court.  Previously,
Judge Barak had officially declared, in publications and lectures, that he wanted to set
limits and legal restrictions over this method86. Nonetheless the Supreme Court ruled, on
November 11, 2005, that targeted killings cannot be considered in themselves illegal. At
the same time, the Court set an important principle of reviewing, case by case,  each
decision allowing such operations since, according to the opinion written by President
Barak, democracies fight sometimes “with one hand tied behind their back”, while the
other must continue to preserve the rule of law and respect the liberty of the individual,
since  this  is  the  foundation  of  national  security87.  This  decision  also  set  down  the
principle that targeted assassinations must be considered exceptional, as Judge Beinish
wrote in her opinion paragraph, because such operations are of an “extreme nature” and
constitute methods to be used only as a last resort. The Supreme Court also established a
legal  necessity  to  respect  proportionality  between  the  security  benefits  of  a  military
operation and civil damages when considering the legal principles underlying “necessary
caution”  and  “required  diligence”.  The  military  are,  therefore,  required  to  take
precautions to protect civilians and, in this sense, they have a duty both to clarify the
decision-making process of these operations and to set harsh, objective, relevant criteria
for identifying targets. 
26 Other issues pertaining to military ethics have also been reviewed, such as arrest88, house
arrest89,  home demolitions90 and humanitarian obligations toward the Territories 91.  In
these  cases,  the  Supreme  Court  framed  the  procedures  by  reinforcing  them,  thus
encouraging the emergence of a new culture within the armed forces with regard to legal
demands. 
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 Awareness of the appeal process and its
consequences 
Fighting with the shadow of the Court?
27 With the development of the enlarged role of the Supreme Court in military matters, it
became very common to hear some Israeli soldiers talk about the existence of an “appeal
awareness” among soldiers. In other words, judicial activism led to the awareness that, in
each operation, every military movement could be reviewed at any time. This situation
has also led to instructions during briefings to always act with the awareness that every
case can be submitted to the Supreme Court. Officers often insist on the fact that such
control and, in some cases, sanctions, pertain to a sphere other than military justice,
since the Supreme Court aspires to be the guardian of human rights and reviews issues in
total independence. The Court’s omnipresence is reinforced by its will to assure access at
anytime, even in “real time”, particularly when an appeal contests violations of human
rights92. Sometimes, an appeal and a ruling will occur while fighting is ongoing93, and it is,
in these cases, that we realize that the Supreme Court is an actor in the conflict. The case
of the Nativity Church in Bethlehem represents the best example94 of such a situation:
appeals based on humanitarian law principles were made while the holy site was still
under occupation. 
 
The emergence of a new culture
28 The IDF has integrated this new reality of the omnipresence of the Supreme Court and the
immediacy of its rulings. It has begun various processes for the incorporation of new
norms and principles which the Court has compelled it to respect in its operations. This is
the reason why a code of ethics, specific to anti-terrorist operations, was drawn up by the
“philosopher of the military”, Professor Asa Kasher95; some of its principles have been
largely confirmed by the Supreme Court in its decisions on targeted killings96. It is also
behind the obligation set down by the Supreme Court to teach armed conflict law to all
troops97. Previously taught only to officers, this law, whose importance has been stressed
by the Supreme Court, is now fully part of military education, in an essentially preventive
function, since humanitarian law proposes an operation manual for avoiding the worst
scenario, according to Judge Dorner98. 
29 In order to fulfil these objectives, a Military Law School was established in 1994, a fact
which underlines the new Israeli military culture and can be attributed to the evolution
of an international system for the judicialization of conflicts and violations of jus in bello,
as seen in the ad hoc court for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 1998 ruling of the
International  Criminal  Court.  The  creation  of  the  School  was  the  occasion  of  the
publication of a manual on armed conflict law99, which was distributed to all army units.
The School also publishes a scientific review, the Israel Defence Forces Law Review, which
aims to provide a forum for discussion and research on the legal aspects of conflicts in
which the IDF is involved and the conduct of warfare. The School has also developed an
interactive software to teach eleven points of law relative to conduct at checkpoints,
using a clear legal  framework and simulation of  very harsh,  controversial,  contested
situations.  It  is  clearly making use of  new technologies  in military education100.  This
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choice is partly due to the difficulty in finding and mobilizing competent personnel to
teach international law in such a context. However, the main objective of this practical
method is not the attainment of a perfect knowledge of armed conflict law, but to give
soldiers practical tools to carry out their operations while respecting the basic principles
of such a law101. 
30 The  awareness  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  power  has  also  produced  an  unexpected
phenomenon:  the  constant  elaboration  of  arguments  by  the  IDF’s  legal  advisers  in
response to possible Supreme Court reviews. David Kretzmer explains that “the mere
existence of a judicial review process has exercised a restrictive power among militaries.”
It is now very common to see authorities abandoning a planned action, when threatened
by a possible legal appeal or petition to be presented to the Court, or after the army’s
legal advisors inform commanders that their actions will be sanctioned by the Court”102.
We can consider such a process as auto-censorship, and it is also visible within military
courts.  Many  military  lawyers  take  into  consideration  these  new  frameworks  when
formulating  opinions  and  conclusions,  and  more  and  more  try  to  negotiate  with  a
plaintiff, if they predict possible sanction against the army, in the case of an appeal to the
Court.  At a more macro level,  one can say that the first  generation of  military legal
advisers  has  emerged  in  Israel  to  enlighten  and  guide  decision-makers,  and  is
contributing to a decision-making process which has integrated judicial activism103. 
31 
The constitutional revolution based on the supremacy of the rule of law, as per the vision
of Aharon Barak, who embodied for a long time the courage of the Supreme Court, gave
birth to a revolution which opened the door to greater legal involvement in daily military
operations in Israel. Even the armed forces, which “possess a State”, to quote Mirabeau’s
description of the Prussian military model, cannot escape today tighter control of their
operations,  as  a  result  of  the judicialization of  military ethics  and the growing legal
formulations  around  troop  morality.  The  fight  against  terrorism  has  considerably
reinforced, in a certain way, the role of the judicial authorities, which is characterized by
clear independent aspirations, even though such a situation might be reversed in the
future. The Supreme Court considers itself to be an arbiter between two important pillars
of democracy: the duty to ensure effective security and a normal life for its citizens and
the protection of individual liberties,  including those of the enemy camp, although a
minima.  The thoughtful, sensitive but necessary Israeli synthesis between security and
liberty, far from being perfect, represents for many experts a model, since it has pushed
back the army’s historical immunity in social, political and legal domains. Nevertheless,
we are still far from the Liberal School which advocates for a (utopian?) perpetual peace
between nations  based on the virtues  of  the  law,  and for  an approach described by
Michael Walzer, in Just and Unjust War, as: “do justice, let the sky fall!”104. 
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ABSTRACTS
For many years, the judicial activism of the Israeli Supreme Court constituted one of the most
impassioned debates in Israeli politics, particularly in respect of the definition of the role which
the highest judicial institution in the country should play in military issues. The Supreme Court’s
most  controversial  interventions  pertain  to  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  and  these  are  so
numerous that the Court can be considered an active player in the task of defining what the
Israeli Defence Forces are allowed to do or not in warfare. This judicial activism in the realm of
the IDF’s ethics is rooted in the wide-scale phenomenon of the “judicialization” of politics and of
the entire public sphere in Israel. This phenomenon has contributed to the emergence of a new
culture within the armed forces, which is characterized by a deep awareness that the Supreme
Court can, at any time, intervene, control and, if necessary, punish.
Depuis plusieurs années maintenant, l’hyperactivisme de la Cour Suprême n’a cessé d’alimenter
des débats passionnés en Israël sur le rôle et le contrôle que peut exercer la plus haute institution
judiciaire du pays dans le conflit. Et parmi les interventions les plus critiquées figurent les très
nombreuses décisions de la cour dans les affaires militaires rendant ainsi progressivement la
Cour, juge de ce que Tsahal est autorisé ou pas de faire. L’origine d’un tel phénomène se situe
clairement dans l’évidente judiciarisation du conflit israélo-palestinien, créatrice de nombreuses
contraintes  juridiques,  bon  an  mal  an  intégrées  par  une  armée  sommée  de  prendre  en
considération que la sécurité nationale ne peut plus être assurée indépendamment du respect du
droit.  Progressivement,  la  Cour  Suprême  israélienne  est  devenue  actrice  de  cette  éthique
militaire israélienne au point de créer une culture nouvelle chez les militaires, fondatrice de ce
que  nous  appelons  la  « conscience  du  recours » :  à  tout  moment,  le  juge  peut  intervenir,
contrôler la légalité des opérations et sanctionner le cas échéant.
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